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Abstract Parfit advertised the priority view as a new and fundamental theory in
the ethics of distribution. He never discusses risk, and many writers follow suit
when discussing the priority view. This article formalizes two popular arguments for
a commonly accepted risk-free definition of the priority view. One is based on a
direct attempt to define the priority view, the other is based on a contrast with
utilitarianism and egalitarianism. But it argues that neither argument succeeds, and
more generally, that it is not possible to make sense of the priority view in a risk-
free framework. As a diagnosis, the article suggests that the literature on the priority
view has paid insufficient attention to axiomatization and has most likely mistaken
the proper role of the use of evaluative measurements in theorizing about the ethics
of distribution. Reasons are eventually offered for thinking that despite appearances,
approaching the priority view in terms of risk from the outset is quite natural.
1 Introduction
The priority view is widely regarded as one of the most important positions on the
ethics of distribution. Closely related views had been discussed before (e.g. Broome
1989; Hurley 1989), but Parfit’s 1991 Lindley Lectures brought the priority view
into prominence (Parfit 2000). Parfit claimed that although many earlier writings on
the ethics of distribution were advertised as arguing for egalitarianism, they were
better interpreted as advocating the priority view. This mattered for Parfit because
he thought that unlike the priority view, egalitarianism faces a serious problem, the
so-called leveling down objection.
Broadly speaking, there have been two sorts of reactions to Parfit’s work. The
first takes Parfit’s account of what the priority view is really saying more or less on
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trust, then seeks to extend his discussion or apply it to new problems. For example,
it has been asked whether the priority view should be applied to questions about
distribution across time but within a single person’s lifetime; whether it should be
applied to the distribution of some goods but not others; whether it should be
combined with egalitarianism; what it implies about problems of population size;
and so on (see e.g. McKerlie 2001; Brown 2007).
The second reaction finds Parfit’s account of the priority view in need of
significant elaboration. Writers in this vein have come to a variety of conclusions
about the priority view and its relationship to egalitarianism. For example, Jensen
(2003) argues that prioritarian and egalitarian orderings are distinct, Tungodden
(2003) argues that the former are strict subset of the latter, while Broome (1991)
argues that the priority view is meaningless. It is these kinds of accounts of the
priority view I will be concerned with.
One very interesting feature of Parfit’s discussion of the priority view is that he
never discusses risk. For example, he only addresses the question of when,
according to the priority view, one outcome (or history, as I will say) is better than
another. Thus I will say that his discussion of the priority view is risk-free: it does
not address the question of when, according to the priority view, one lottery over
histories is better than another.
Much of the subsequent literature follows Parfit in this respect, discussing the
priority view in entirely risk-free terms. In other writings Parfit seems to regard the
extension of not just the priority view, but any risk-free distributive view, to cover
cases involving risk as fairly trivial: an appeal to expected utility theory is all that is
needed (Parfit 1984, 2011). But other philosophers see significant issues arising in
the extension of even just the priority view to cover risky cases (see e.g. Rabinowicz
2001, 2002; Broome 2004; Fleurbaey 2004; McCarthy 2008). Nevertheless, it is fair
to say that all of these writers follow Parfit in regarding the core ideas of the priority
view as statable in risk-free terms.
The main claim of this article is that this is a mistake: we cannot make sense of
the priority view in a risk-free framework. There is no distributive theory which is
statable in risk-free terms, provides an an ethically well-motivated alternative to
both utilitarianism and egalitarianism, and more or less satisfies Parfit’s description
of the priority view.
The starting place for this argument is quite simple. There is widespread
agreement on which of Parfit’s remarks are central to his account of what the
priority view is saying. Section 2 rehearses these remarks and discusses how they
should be interpreted as providing an implicit definition of the priority view. The
discussion is further simplified by the fact that most writers who offer risk-free
accounts of the priority view seem to agree on how it should be defined, and Sect. 3
therefore offers what I will call the risk-free definition of the priority view. The
complexities begin when we turn to the issue of how the risk-free definition has
been defended.
As well as the many clearly distinct risk-free treatments of the priority view
mentioned above, some apparently almost identical accounts turn out to be
importantly different in crucial but unacknowledged respects. Thus it will help to
have some way of organizing the various defenses. One natural division runs
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through Parfit’s own discussion: some of his remarks seek to explain the priority
view directly, while others try to explain it by contrasting it with other distributive
views. Although they are often run together, I will therefore distinguish between
direct and contrastive defenses of the risk-free definition. Sections 4 and 5 offer
rigorous risk-free versions of these defenses. Sections 6 and 7 then argue that all
risk-free direct defenses fail, while Sects. 8 and 9 argue that all risk-free contrastive
defenses fail. The conclusion is that we cannot make sense of the priority view in a
risk-free framework.
Despite the negative conclusion, Sect. 10 tries to draw three lessons. First, the
discussion hints at what I think are promising strategies for trying to define the
priority view in terms of risk. I hope to develop this approach elsewhere, but it
would seem idiosyncratic without a clear view of the problems with risk-free
approaches. Second, it is more or less orthodoxy in moral philosophy to appeal to
the existence of various evaluative measures in articulating and defending
distributive views. I believe that this is a serious mistake, but while I will not be
able to argue here for that general claim, the criticisms of risk-free approaches to the
priority view form what I hope is a useful case study. Third, while axiomatic
methods are common in discussions of the ethics of distribution in welfare
economics, moral philosophy has made much less use of them. But while many risk-
free approaches to the priority view seem intuitively compelling, their faultlines
only really appear when one asks how they could be axiomatized in a way which
yields the needed theorems. Moral philosophy would do well to pay more attention
to axiomatization.
2 The Prioritarian Platitudes
The term ‘the priority view’ was introduced by Parfit, so how the priority view
should be understood has to largely defer to what he says about it. This section
discusses how his informal remarks could be shaped into an implicit definition. To
simplify, I will assume throughout a fixed population of individuals 1, …, n.
First some terminology. The betterness relation holds between two lotteries over
histories just in case the first is at least as good as the second. What I will call the risk-
free betterness relation holds between two histories h1 and h2 just in case h1 is at least
as good as h2. It is thus a restriction, or special case, of the betterness relation. Roughly
speaking, the risk-free betterness relation is anonymous just in case the identities of
people do not matter. More precisely, suppose that there is some mapping q of the
population onto itself such that for each member i of the population, h1 is exactly as
good for i as h2 is for q(i). Then the risk-free betterness relation is anonymous iff in all
such cases, h1 is exactly as good as h2. The risk-free principle of personal good says
that if two histories h1 and h2 are equally good for each person, they are equally good;
and if h1 is better than h2 for some member of the population, and at least as good for
every member of the population, then h1 is better than h2.
Below are eleven claims Parfit makes about the priority view, directly or
implicitly, followed by brief glosses. Apart from the first two, we do not yet aim for
much precision. Page references are to Parfit (2000).
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P1. According to the priority view, the risk-free betterness relation is anonymous.
Parfit does not discuss this idea, but it is obvious from his discussion (348).
P2. According to the priority view, the risk-free principle of personal good is true.
What Parfit calls moderate forms of egalitarianism agree that the risk-free principle
of personal good is true, although strong forms disagree (377).1
P3. According to the priority view, benefits have absolute value.
How much it matters to benefit someone depends only on how badly off she is, and
not on whether others are better off than her (369).
P4. According to the priority view, benefits have declining marginal value.
Or in Parfit’s words, benefiting people matters more the worse off these people are
(366, 369, 372). Parfit writes as if this is the core idea of the priority view. But he
also says that this claim does not define a different view as it would be accepted by
all egalitarians (368–369).
P5. The priority view emerges from the Divided World example.
To be discussed in Sect. 5, this is the only concrete example Parfit offers to
illustrate the priority view. Any account of the priority view will have to make sense
of it.
P6. The core idea of the priority view is somehow intrapersonal.
According to the priority view, what is bad about people being worse off is that
they are worse off than they might have been (369).
P7. The priority view has distinctive implications in one-person cases.
The gloss on P4 and P6 has suggested to commentators, with Parfit’s apparent
endorsement, that it matters more to benefit someone the worse off she is even when
no others are around at all (Rabinowicz 2001, 2002).
P8. The priority view is a new distributive theory and expresses an ethically
natural and fundamental idea.
It would be difficult to uphold the idea that the priority view expresses an ethically
natural and fundamental idea if it turned out to rest on an ethically arbitrary or
insignificant distinction. To elaborate on the novelty of the priority view we have:
P9. There is an ethically fundamental contrast between the priority view and
egalitarianism.
1 Whenever I speak of egalitarianism I have in mind a pure form of egalitarianism which departs from
utilitarianism solely in the direction of being somehow concerned with equality. I have no wish to deny
that a concern with equality could be combined with, say, a concern with fairness and a concern with
giving priority to the worse off. I have no strong objection to calling such a mixed theory a form of
egalitarianism, but that is not how I will use terminology.
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Parfit’s explication of the priority view is largely based on a contrast with
egalitarianism. The final contrast is not that clear however (cf. the gloss on P2 and
P4), so this aspect of Parfit’s discussion is more suggestive than definite. However:
P10. According to the priority view, and in contrast with egalitarianism, it does
not matter how well off people are relative to one another (370).
Now one might think that the ‘‘nonrelative/relative concern’’ distinction is just a
paraphrase of the ‘‘absolute/nonabsolute value’’ distinction which features in P3.
But it will turn out that these two distinctions are naturally interpreted in different
ways, and should not be conflated.
P11. There is an ethically fundamental contrast between the priority view and
utilitarianism.
Parfit clearly regards the priority view as antiutilitarian, but says little about where,
according to the priority view, utilitarianism goes wrong. But with Parfit’s apparent
endorsement, Rabinowicz (2001, 2002) says that the priority view is motivated by
Rawls’s famous ‘‘separateness of persons’’ criticism of utilitarianism.
I will call P1 through P11 the prioritarian platitudes because they are closer to
elaborations on the meaning of ‘the priority view’ than to substantive claims about
an independently defined theory. This need not take any controversial view about
the analytic/synthetic distinction (Jackson 2000).
Suppose that interpreting some theory as the priority view vindicates the
prioritarian platitudes both well enough and better than any other theory. On one
view, that theory just is the priority view. On the other main view, it may be vague
what the priority view is, but we would nevertheless do best to define the priority
view as that theory. I will not try to decide between these views. By contrast, if no
theory vindicates the prioritarian platitudes well enough when interpreted as the
priority view, ‘the priority view’ is ill-defined.
3 The Risk-Free Definition of the Priority View
Although Parfit does not give a formal definition of the priority view, others have
offered one which seems to grow out of his discussion. The definition takes for
granted an assumption about evaluative measurement, and we are going to need to
look very closely at the role of evaluative measurement in risk-free accounts of the
priority view. The assumption in question here is about quantitative measures of
how good things are for people, or what I will call individual goodness measures.
An individual goodness measure is a real-valued function defined on individual/
history pairs which purports to measure how good the history is for the individual.
For a function g to be an individual goodness measure it will have to satisfy the
following (as well as perhaps other constraints).
(1) For any individuals i and j and any histories h1 and h2, h1 is at least as good
for i as h2 is for j iff g(i, h1) C g(j, h2).
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The literature on the priority view assumes that it makes sense to compare units of
individual goodness. This means that it takes for granted the following.
RF1. Individual goodness measures exist and are unique up to positive affine
transformation.
A positive affine transformation involves multiplication by a positive constant plus
addition of an arbitrary constant. So RF1 implies that if g is an individual goodness
measure, then so too is f just in case f = ag ? b for some positive real number a and
arbitrary b. Throughout I will take g to be some fixed individual goodness measure.
When a particular individual i is fixed I will often write g(i, h) as gi(h). Then with
each history h there is an associated individual goodness profile, the n-tuple
½g1ðhÞ; . . .; gnðhÞ.
It will help to make a standard simplifying assumption. Say that the domain (of
the risk-free betterness relation) is rich just in case the set of individual goodness
profiles is In for some interval I of real numbers of positive length. For example, if
I is the whole of the real numbers, a rich domain means that for any n-tuple of real
numbers, there is some history which has that n-tuple as its individual goodness
profile. The assumption of richness is what is often known as a structural
assumption. It enables us to provide simple illustrations of many of the distributive
ideas we will be discussing, and I will take it for granted.
Since RF1 implies that g is only one of many individual goodness measures, we
always have to check that what we use it to say does not depend on which individual
goodness measure it actually is. This is usually straightforward, and will often be
left implicit. For example, if the domain is rich relative to one individual goodness
measure, RF1 immediately implies that it is rich relative to any individual goodness
measure.
With RF1 to hand, Broome (1989), Fleurbaey (2004), Jensen (2003) and
Tungodden (2003) endorse the following.
The risk-free definition of the priority view. For any population of individuals
1, …, n there is some strictly increasing and strictly concave function w such
that the best available history h containing that population maximizes the
value of wðg1ðhÞÞ þ    þ wðg1ðhÞÞ:2
The discussion will run more smoothly if we generalize slightly. A real-valued
function f is said to represent an ordering % just in case for all x and y in the set
ordered by % : x % y () f ðxÞ  f ðyÞ. Roughly speaking, if a function represents
an ordering, it can be regarded as a description of that ordering, with the caveat that
one ordering can be described by more than one function. For any real function
w, let P(w) be the function on histories defined by
PðwÞðhÞ ¼ wðg1ðhÞÞ þ    þ wðgnðhÞÞ
2 A function f from the reals to the reals is strictly increasing iff for any x; y 2 R; x [ y ) f ðxÞ[ f ðyÞ. It
is strictly concave iff for any distinct x; y 2 R and any a 2 ð0; 1Þ; f ðax þ ð1  aÞyÞ[ af ðxÞþ
ð1  aÞf ðyÞ.
D. McCarthy
123
Then with a small generalization, the risk-free definition defines the priority view
as saying that there is some strictly increasing and strictly concave w such that
P(w) represents the risk-free betterness relation.
But why should we accept the risk-free definition? As already noted, there are
two basic approaches both in Parfit’s work and in the subsequent literature. The
direct defense tries to defend it by appealing the prioritarian platitudes which seem
to be solely about the priority view, while the contrastive defense appeals to the
platitudes which seem to contrast the priority view with other distributive views.
These defenses are often combined, but they involve very different assumptions and
problems, so I will present them separately. In keeping with the focus on risk-free
approaches to the priority view, the article will say little about attempts to augment
these defenses by borrowing ideas which are covertly or overtly about risk.
4 The Direct Defense
Almost everyone who has tried to defend the risk-free definition of the priority view
has endorsed the direct defense. It is most explicit in Jensen (2003); see also
Rabinowicz (2001, 2002). But I will develop it in my own way and bring out certain
important assumptions which are typically left implicit. The direct defense appeals
to the prioritarian platitudes which seem to come closest to directly defining the
priority view without referring to other distributive views. In particular, the main
goal of the direct defense is to argue that we vindicate P1 through P4 if and only if
we accept the risk-free definition.
P1 and P2 need no further interpretation, so the bulk of the direct defense
concerns P3 and P4, which together say that according to the priority view, benefits
have both absolute and declining marginal value. However, how the claim that
benefits have both absolute and declining marginal value should be interpreted is not
obvious. The claim adopts the language of evaluative measurement, but it is far
from clear what exactly it is saying and what assumptions it is taking for granted.
We will therefore need to address three tasks: (i) provide a fully explicit
interpretation of P3 and P4 in the language of evaluative measurement; (ii) connect
the risk-free definition with parallel claims made in terms of evaluative measure-
ment; and (iii) use (i) and (ii) to prove that the prioritarian platitudes P1 through P4
are equivalent to the risk-free definition.
4.1 Interpretation
Suppose the population contains two people, A and B. No matter how we understand
benefits, the transition from an individual goodness profile [0,0] to [1,0] provides
A with the same benefit as the transition from [0,10] to [1,10]. For in each case the
transition takes A from 0 to 1. Since B is unaffected by each transition, it is natural
to interpret the claim that benefits have absolute value as exemplified by the claim
that the two transitions are equally good.
To interpret the idea that benefits have declining marginal value, we need to say
more about when two benefits are the same. It is natural to understand this in terms
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of arithmetic differences in individual goodness, so that taking A from 0 to 1
provides her with the same benefit as taking her from 9 to 10; see e.g. Jensen (2003).
Given RF1, this idea is well-defined. The idea that benefits have declining marginal
value is then naturally exemplified by the claim that the transition from [0,10] to
[1,10] is better than the transition from [9,10] to [10,10]. For A receives the same
benefit in each case but her starting place is worse in the first transition, while B is
unaffected.
These ideas need to be generalized, but they rely on the idea that we understand
what it means to say that one transition is at least as good as another. But those who
accept the direct defense plainly have a view about this; see e.g. Broome (1991)
p. 179 and Jensen (2003) p. 99. Roughly speaking, the idea is that one transition is
better than another just in case the first produces a greater increase in goodness than
the second.
More precisely, goodness measures are real-valued functions defined on histories
which, perhaps among other things, represent the risk-free betterness relation. For
talk about comparisons of increases in goodness to be well-defined, we need to
assume
RF2. Goodness measures exist and are unique up to positive affine
transformation.
Taking RF2 for granted, we can now be more precise. Let G be a goodness
measure. Then the idea is that the transition from a history k1 to a history k2 is at
least as good as the transition from k3 to k4 just in case G(k2) - G(k1) C G(k4) -
G(k3). RF2 guarantees that this is well-defined; that is, it is independent of the
particular choice of goodness measure.
We have seen natural exemplars of the claim that benefits have absolute value
and the claim that benefits have declining marginal value. With the understanding of
when one transition is better than another to hand, the following are natural
generalizations of the exemplars.
RF3. Benefits have absolute value iff for any histories h1; . . .; h4 containing a
population 1,…, n any individual k, and any goodness measure G: if (i) for each
member i of the population apart from k, h1 is exactly as good for i as h2, and h3 is
exactly as good for i as h4, and (ii) h1 is exactly as good for k as h3, and h2 is
exactly as good for k as h4, then (iii) G(h2) - G(h1) = G(h4) - G(h3).
RF4. Benefits have declining marginal value iff for any histories h1; . . .; h4
containing a population 1,…, n any individual k, and any goodness measure G: if
(i) for each member i of the population apart from k; h1; . . .; h4 are all equally
good for i, and (ii) gk(h2) - gk(h1) = gk(h4) - gk(h3) [ 0 and gk(h3) [ gk(h1),
then (iii) G(h2) - G(h1) [ G(h4) - G(h3).
These two claims provide interpretations of the two italicized statements. RF1
makes explicit a presupposition which is vital to RF4, while RF2 makes explicit a
presupposition which is vital to both RF3 and RF4. The interpretation of the
prioritarian platitudes P3 and P4, with all their presuppositions fully spelled out, is
therefore provided by RF1 through RF4.
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4.2 The Risk-Free Definition and Goodness
We have just interpreted the crucial platitudes P3 and P4 in terms of goodness
measures. The risk-free definition of the priority view says nothing overt about
goodness measures. So to use the platitudes to defend the risk-free definition, we
need to somehow connect the risk-free definition with suitable claims involving
goodness measures. But a natural answer is to hand, for the following seems to be
taken for granted by many friends of the risk-free definition (e.g. Jensen 2003 p. 99).
RF5. P(w) represents the risk-free betterness relation for some strictly increasing
and strictly concave function w ) P(w) is a goodness measure.
4.3 Deriving the Risk-Free Definition
RF1 through RF5 together make fully explicit all the assumptions needed for the
direct defense. We now just need to show that with them, the appropriate
prioritarian platitudes lead to the risk-free definition. One direction of the following
result is implicit in the literature.
Proposition 1 Assume RF1 through RF4, and a rich domain. Then the risk-free
betterness relation is anonymous, the risk-free principle of personal good is true,
and benefits have absolute and declining marginal value () for some strictly
increasing and strictly concave w, P(w) is a goodness measure, unique up to
positive affine transformation.
Assuming RF1 through RF4, versions of the direct defense I am familiar with
make a case for the ‘‘(’’ part of the biconditional, which is obvious. But they need
the ‘‘)’’ part as well. This is more important and harder to show, but Appendix A
provides a proof. But Proposition 1 yields the result we are seeking.
Theorem 1 Assume RF1 through RF5, and a rich domain. Then P1 through P4
are true () the risk-free definition of the priority view is correct.3
In summary, the direct defense relies heavily on claims made in the language of
evaluative measurement. But these claims need to be interpreted and their
presuppositions made fully explicit. Together RF1 through RF5 do that. But with
RF1 through RF5 to hand, it follows that we vindicate the core prioritarian
platitudes P1 through P4 if and only if we accept the risk-free definition.
3 Proof. Assume RF1 through RF5. For ‘‘)’’, suppose P1 through P4 are true. These together imply that
according to the priority view, the left-hand side of the biconditional in Proposition 1 is true. It then
follows that according to the priority view, the right-hand side of the biconditional is true. But if P(w) is a
goodness measure for some strictly increasing and strictly concave w, P(w) certainly represents the risk-
free betterness relation. Hence P1 through P4 jointly imply the risk-free definition. For ‘‘(’’, suppose the
risk-free definition is correct. Given RF2 and RF5 it then follows that according to the priority view, the
right-hand side of the biconditional in Proposition 1 is true. Given RF1, RF3 and RF4, that then implies
that according to the priority view, the left-hand side of the biconditional is true, which implies P1
through P4, as required.
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Sections 6 and 7 will offer some criticisms of the direct defense. But first it will
help to understand the other main way of trying to defend the risk-free definition,
the contrastive defense.
5 The Contrastive Defense
The contrastive defense also aims to establish that we vindicate certain prioritarian
platitudes if and only if we accept the risk-free definition. Like the direct defense, it
regards some of these platitudes as needing further interpretation; unlike the direct
defense, it avoids making use of goodness measures and appeals instead to contrasts
with other distributive views. The literature mostly focuses on egalitarianism, but
we will need to look at utilitarianism as well.
5.1 The Contrast with Egalitarianism
Egalitarians are concerned with inequality, but to be concerned with inequality is to
be concerned with certain patterns between people. This is crucial to Parfit’s
understanding of the contrast between egalitarianism and the priority view. As he
puts it, egalitarians are concerned with relativities, but prioritarians are not. But how
should the concern with patterns be understood?
Suppose two histories are such that that for each member i of some subgroup of
the population, the two histories are equally good for i. In trying to rank the two
histories, we might be tempted to ignore the members of the subgroup, for none of
them is affected by the choice between the two histories. However, it has seemed to
many people that the presence of these people might well make a difference to the
patterns of inequality in the two histories, in one case for the better and in the other
case for the worse. It has therefore seemed to many people that a defining feature of
egalitarianism is the denial that it is always safe to ignore such subpopulations (Sen
1973; Broome 1989; Temkin 1993).
To illustrate with an example modeled on the Allais paradox (cf. Sen 1973;
Broome 1989), let k1 through k4 have respective individual goodness profiles
[1,1,1,1], [3,0,1,1], [1,1,0,0] and [3,0,0,0]. Someone impressed by the equality in k1
might think it better than k2, but think that there is not much difference in the
badness of the inequality in k3 and k4 and think k4 better than k3 because of its
greater total. But suppose we ignore persons 3 and 4 in the comparison between k1
and k2 on the grounds that they are unaffected by the choice, and also ignore them in
the comparison between k3 and k4 for the same reason. Then claiming that k1 is
better than k2 forces us to conclude that k3 is better than k4.
To formalize, suppose we can partition the population into two groups I and
J such that (i) for all i in I, h1 is exactly as good for i as h3, and h2 is exactly as good
for i as h4; and (ii) for all j in J, h1 is exactly as good for j as h2, and h3 is exactly as
good for j as h4. The risk-free betterness relation is strongly separable if and only if
in all such cases: h1 is at least as good as h2 iff h3 is at least as good as h4. For short,
I will often refer to this idea as ‘risk-free strong separability’, and will usually drop
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the ‘risk-free’. Then a popular way of at least partially characterizing egalitarianism
is to claim that it denies strong separability.
This argument generalizes. Being concerned with inequality is one way of being
concerned with how well off people are in relation to one another, but the argument
seems to apply to any kind of concern with how well off people are relative to one
another. This suggests that the ‘‘nonrelative versus relative’’ distinction should be
interpreted in terms of the ‘‘strongly separable versus not strongly separable’’
distinction. Notice how different this interpretation of ‘‘nonrelative versus relative’’
is from the earlier interpretation of the superficially similar ‘‘absolute versus
nonabsolute’’ distinction. The latter was interpreted by assuming a lot about the
quantitative structure of goodness; the former has just been interpreted solely in
terms of qualitative features of the risk-free betterness relation.
Given the partial characterization of egalitarianism in terms of the denial of
strong separability, and given the way Parfit contrasts the priority view with
egalitarianism, it seems mandatory to follow Broome (1989), Jensen (2003) and
McCarthy (2008) and accept
RF6. The fundamental contrast between the priority view and egalitarianism is
that the priority view accepts risk-free strong separability, while egalitarianism
rejects it.
This takes us some way towards a definition of the priority view, but not all of the
way. Utilitarians claim that one history is at least as good as another if and only if it
contains at least as great a sum of individual goodness. That immediately implies
that utilitarians accept strong separability, so we cannot define the priority view
solely in terms of strong separability. We need to look at how it contrasts with
utilitarianism. In the spirit of the way the contrastive defense has so far been
developed, I will avoid trying to do this by appealing to goodness measures.
5.2 The Contrast with Utilitarianism
As I will understand it, there are two parts to the contrast with utilitarianism. The
first seeks to articulate a principle which provides the content of the antiutilitarian
component of the priority view. The second tries to show that the motivation for this
principle arises from a natural criticism of utilitarianism.
A Pigou–Dalton transfer takes a unit of individual goodness from a better off
person and gives it to a worse off person while leaving the first person no worse off
than the second person. Everyone else is left unaffected. In speaking of units of
individual goodness, this definition presupposes RF1. Consider
The Pigou–Dalton principle. If a history h1 can be obtained from a history h2
by a Pigou–Dalton transfer, then h1 is better than h2.
There are three reasons for thinking that the Pigou–Dalton principle spells out the
antiutilitarian content of the priority view. First, several philosophers have thought
that even if the interpretation of the claim that benefits have declining marginal
value is not entirely clear, that claim at least obviously entails the Pigou–Dalton
principle (see e.g. Jensen (2003). Second, consider a minor variation on what Parfit
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calls the Divided World. Two communities of the same size are unaware of each
other’s existence. In h1 everyone is at individual goodness level 150. In h2 one
community is at 200 and the other is at 100. Parfit suggests that h1 is better than h2,
and that this claim expresses the heart of the priority view. But this conclusion can
be derived from a series of applications of the Pigou–Dalton principle. Third, Parfit
clearly implies that the priority view departs from utilitarianism in the direction of
giving more priority to the worse off. But the Pigou–Dalton seems to be the weakest
natural principle one could accept which gives more priority to the worse off than
utilitarianism does. Thus perhaps because of the combination of these three reasons,
Tungodden (2003) and McCarthy (2008) suggest that the Pigou–Dalton principle
just is the antiutilitarian component of the priority view.
Turning now to motivation, Rabinowicz (2001, 2002) claimed, with Parfit’s
apparent endorsement, that the antiutilitarian aspect of the priority view is motivated
by the famous separateness of persons criticism of utilitarianism in Rawls (1971).
Rawls’s starting point was the impartial spectator argument. According to this
argument, two histories h1 and h2 can be compared as follows (Rawls 1971; Nagel
1970). The lives of each member of the population in h1 are concatenated into a
single life via something like the serial-life construction of Lewis (1946); likewise
for h2. The impartial spectator imagines the lives in full detail, and ranks the
histories by ranking their associated serial-lives. Rawls claimed that transfers of
units of individual goodness from one part of an (ordinary) life to another part are
unproblematic. When this idea is applied to serial-lives, the impartial spectator
construction implies that transfers of units of individual goodness from one person’s
life to a different person’s life are equally unproblematic, and the result is
utilitarianism. But Rawls objected. He claimed that because the impartial spectator
construction conflates the lives of different people into the life of a single person,
utilitarianism‘‘does not take seriously the distinction between persons’’ (Rawls 1971
p. 28).
If one is moved by this objection, one will look for some natural principle which
restricts transfers between different people more than utilitarianism does in a way
which somehow takes the separateness of persons into account. The Pigou–Dalton
principle seems to be the obvious candidate, for in effect it says that it is bad to take
a unit of individual goodness from a worse off person and give it to a better off
person. Thus the Pigou–Dalton principle can be seen as being motivated by a
concern with the separateness of persons. Combining the contrastive and
motivational remarks, it then becomes natural to accept
RF7. The fundamental contrast between the priority view and utilitarianism is
that the priority view accepts the Pigou–Dalton principle, while utilitarianism
rejects it.
I stress that I am not endorsing the claim that utilitarianism improperly ignores the
separateness of persons. Rather, I have sketched an influential view about the way
various ideas are taken to be connected, and have suggested that RF7 makes some of
these connections explicit in a natural way.
D. McCarthy
123
5.3 Deriving the Risk-Free Definition, Again
We can now conclude the contrastive defense. Taking RF1 for granted we have
Proposition 2 Assume a population of at least three people and a rich domain.
Then the risk-free betterness relation can be represented by P(w) for some strictly
increasing and strictly concave w () the risk-free betterness relation is
anonymous and continuous, the risk-free principle of personal good is true, the
risk-free betterness relation is strongly separable, and the Pigou–Dalton principle
is true.
This follows from what Wakker (1989) calls the central theorem for additive
representation. The claim that the risk-free betterness relation is continuous is
usually regarded as a technical condition and often ignored. Just to illustrate,
suppose one individual goodness profile is better than another. Then continuity
implies that some sufficiently small change to the former will still leave it better
than the latter; see Wakker for details. But Proposition 2 entails a conclusion of the
desired form.
Theorem 2 Assume RF1, RF6, RF7, at least three people, and a rich domain.
Then P1, P2, P9 and P11 are true and the risk-free betterness relation is continuous
() the risk-free definition of the priority view is correct.
In summary, RF1 is commonly assumed in discussions of the ethics of
distribution, while RF6 and RF7 provide a natural interpretation of the way the
priority view contrasts with egalitarianism and utilitarianism. But if we take
continuity on trust then provided there are at least three people,4 it follows that we
vindicate the prioritarian platitudes P1, P2, P9 and P11 if and only if we accept the
risk-free definition.
5.4 Summary
It should be stressed that both the direct and the contrastive defenses of the risk-free
definition do not mechanically exploit the prioritarian platitudes, but depend on
further interpreting some of them. The direct defense makes assumptions about
goodness measures to interpret the idea that benefits have both absolute and
declining marginal value. The contrastive defense depends on views about the
separateness of persons and about concerns with patterns to interpret the way the
priority view is supposed to contrast with utilitarianism and egalitarianism. Both
4 The case where the population contains exactly two people is tricky. In such cases, strong separability
implies nothing beyond what is already implied by the risk-free principle of personal good, and does not
guarantee an additive representation. It is therefore not much use in distinguishing the priority view from
egalitarianism in such cases, so RF6 is at least slightly exaggerated and should be restricted to the case
where there are at least three people. To guarantee an additive representation in the n = 2 case one needs
to appeal to the so-called hexagon condition; see Wakker (1989) for more details. However, the hexagon
condition is extremely complicated and it is hard to see that it expresses a natural ethical idea, let alone
one which naturally separates the priority view from egalitarianism. I will not say anything more about
this, but it points to a significant gap in the literature and one more difficulty for the contrastive defense
beyond those to later be discussed.
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defenses make assumptions about the existence and uniqueness of individual
goodness measures.
Friends of the risk-free definition will no doubt be encouraged by the fact that
two rather different forms of argument lead to that definition. Like having two
independent pieces of evidence for the same hypothesis, two different arguments for
the risk-free definition will seem to provide greater support for that definition than
each taken separately. I will refer to the conjunction of these defenses as the risk-
free defense.
We have now seen rigorous versions of the two main approaches to defending the
risk-free definition of the priority view. We will soon note some variants on these,
but now it is time to start criticizing them. The next two sections will argue that the
direct defense is a failure, and the two after that will argue that the contrastive
defense also fails.
6 Criticisms of The Direct Defense: The Structure of Goodness
Goodness measures play a crucial role in the direct defense. Assumptions about
them are often left implicit or taken for granted in defenses of the risk-free definition
of the priority view. The direct defense was formulated to make these assumptions
fully explicit, but we will now see that the assumptions make the direct defense
highly problematic.
The direct defense makes two assumptions about goodness measures. In RF2 it
assumes that goodness measures exist and are unique up to positive affine
transformation. In RF5 it assumes that if P(w) represents the risk-free betterness
relation for some strictly increasing and strictly concave function w, then P(w) is a
goodness measure. Together, these imply that according to the risk-free definition of
the priority view, the priority view implies not just that for some strictly increasing
and strictly concave function w, P(w) represents the risk-free betterness relation, but
also that P(w) is a goodness measure, unique up to positive affine transformation.
We need to ask whether the two assumptions are true, and whether the direct
defense really needs them.
Let’s begin with their truth. It is far from obvious. The only obvious constraint
that a goodness measure G has to satisfy is that
(2) For all histories h1 and h2, G(h1) C G(h2) iff h1 is at least as good as h2.
In other words, goodness measures have to represent the risk-free betterness
relation. However, for any function h and any strictly increasing function f we have
For all x and y : hðxÞ hðyÞ () f ðhðxÞÞ  f ðhðyÞÞ:
Thus when a function represents an ordering, so does any increasing transfor-
mation of the function. But this means that if (2) is the only constraint which a
goodness measure has to satisfy, then goodness measures are unique only up to
increasing transformation. But there are vastly many more increasing transforma-
tions than positive affine transformations, so if (2) is indeed the only constraint on
goodness measures, then RF2 is false.
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The point can be put another way. If for some reason we are convinced of RF2,
then RF5 becomes questionable. Even if it is given that P(w) represents the risk-free
betterness relation, all that follows from RF2 is that the goodness measures are the
positive affine transformations of some increasing transformation of P(w), not of
P(w) itself. Thus the combined package of RF2 and RF5 is highly problematic.
Let’s now ask how troubling this is for the direct defense. On the face of it, it is
very troubling. The direct defense needs both RF2 and RF5. It certainly needs RF2,
for as already noted, the inequalities which RF3 and RF4 use to interpret the idea
that benefits have absolute and declining marginal value are well-defined if and only
if goodness measures are unique up to positive affine transformation. But RF5 is
needed as well, as a simple example will illustrate.
Without RF5, RF2 only tells that the risk-free definition of the priority view tells
us that according to the priority view, for some strictly increasing and strictly
concave w, some increasing transformation of P(w) is a goodness measure. But let
Q(w) be the fifth power of P(w), an increasing transformation of P(w), let w be the
square root function, and consider what happens if Q(w) is a goodness measure.
Assume a population of two people and let h1 through h6 have individual
goodness profiles [0,0], [1,0], [0,10], [1,10], [9,10] and [10, 10]. According to the
direct defense, the idea that benefits have absolute value was exemplified by the
claim that the transition from h1 to h2 produces the same increase in goodness as
the transition from h3 to h4. Likewise, the idea that benefits have declining marginal
value was taken to be exemplified by the claim that the transition from h1 to h2
produces a greater increase in goodness than the transition from h5 to h6. However,
if Q(w) is a goodness measure, a quick calculation shows that both of these claims
are false. Thus if the natural default position that goodness measures are unique only
up to increasing transformation is correct, the risk-free definition of the priority
view certainly does not imply that according to the priority view, the value of
benefits is absolute, nor does it imply that according to the priority view, benefits
have declining marginal value. But that implies that the risk-free definition does not
vindicate the relevant prioritarian platitudes.
7 Criticisms of The Direct Defense: Ethical Significance
Nevertheless, the direct defense is natural enough, and we should not be too quick to
dismiss it. This section therefore looks at various ways in which it might be
modified in the light of the preceding criticisms. But to evaluate these modifications
we first need to say a little more about what a successful defense of a definition of
the priority view would achieve.
Much of the excitement about Parfit’s discussion of the priority view came from
the impression that he had uncovered a fundamental distributive theory which was
genuinely different from others on the market. So vindicating P8, part of which says
that the priority view expresses an ethically natural and fundamental idea, is central
to the project of providing an explicit definition of the priority view.
Parfit’s vision seems convincing in part because the idea that benefits have
absolute and declining marginal value seems ethically natural and fundamental. But
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the direct defense interpreted this idea in terms of goodness measures, and that ran
into the threat of presupposition failure. This section will examine ways in which
that problem with the direct defense might be avoided, but we will see that these
attempts come with costs. In particular, they leave us with no reason to believe that
the idea that benefits have absolute and declining marginal value has any real ethical
significance.
I see little hope for defending RF2 in a risk-free framework in a way which does
not make disputed assumptions about which theory about the ethics of distribution is
correct. But an argument for the correctness of a definition of the priority view
should rest on a more neutral basis than that. Instead, this section examines three
attempts to patch up the direct defense without relying on RF2.
The first attempt starts by considering what I will call the strong risk-free
definition of the priority view, proposed by Rabinowicz (2001), which says that the
following is a definition of the priority view.
(3) According to the priority view, for some strictly increasing and strictly
concave w, P(w) is a goodness measure, unique up to positive affine
transformation.
We could then drop RF2 and still run one direction of the direct defense. Without
going through the details, we could conclude that the strong risk-free definition of
the priority view vindicates the prioritarian platitudes the direct defense appeals to,
in particular the platitudes concerning the absolute and declining marginal value of
benefits.
We cannot claim that those platitudes imply the strong risk-free definition of the
priority view. The basic problem is that in the absence of RF2, the interpretations
offered by RF3 and RF4 of what it is for benefits to have absolute and declining
marginal value are ill-defined.5 Nevertheless, the fact that the strong risk-free
definition vindicates the platitudes in question may seem to provide support for the
strong risk-free definition.
However, the one-way nature of this defense should arouse our suspicion. For if
the prioritarian platitudes do not imply the strong risk-free definition, it is unclear
what the ethical content of the priority view is according to the strong risk-free
definition beyond what was already implied by the original risk-free definition. The
original definition tells us that according to the priority view, P(w) represents the
risk-free betterness relation for some strictly increasing and strictly concave w. This
is consistent with the claim that according to the priority view, the goodness
measures are the positive affine transformations of the cube root of P(w); the claim
that they are the positive affine transformations of the cube of P(w); or the claim that
they are the positive affine transformations of P(w) itself, as the strong risk-free
definition claims. But each of these pairwise-inconsistent claims makes the priority
view imply exactly the same claims about the extension of the risk-free betterness
relation as the original risk-free definition. We are therefore left with little
5 I am being slightly casual. A bit more precisely, RF3 and RF4 suffer from presupposition failure if we
abandon RF2. But there are different views about what to say about presupposition failure, and I sidestep
the question of whether it means that RF3 and RF4 are false, meaningless, truth-valueless or whatever.
Whatever we say, it is obvious that this direction of the direct defense is in trouble.
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understanding of what the genuine ethical content of the priority view is according
to the strong risk-free definition which is not already built into the original risk-free
definition. But without this understanding, we cannot claim that on the strong risk-
free definition, the priority view expresses a natural and basic ethical idea.
The second attempt starts by trying to fix the problem with the first. Instead of
proposing to make (3) come out true by definition, we might try to derive (3) by
trying to argue for
(4) P(w) represents the risk-free betterness relation for some strictly increasing
and strictly concave function w ¼) PðwÞ is a goodness measure unique up to
positive affine transformation.
I believe (4) is tacitly accepted by several writers (e.g. Jensen 2003 p. 99), and in
fact, there is an interesting argument for accepting it. Suppose that P(w) represents
the risk-free betterness relation. Because of its additive form, it is appealingly
simple. But of all its increasing transformations, the only ones which preserve the
appealingly simple additive form are the positive affine transformations. All the
others result in functions which are intuitively more mathematically complicated.
Now suppose we wish to define goodness measures in a way which enable us to
talk meaningfully about units of goodness. After all, philosophers do sometimes talk
quantitatively about goodness and are likely to continue to, so it would be useful if
we could arrive at a convention which fixed the meaning of this talk. That means
fixing goodness measures up to positive affine transformation. It would be foolish to
make our measures needlessly complicated, and therefore sensible to adopt (4) as a
convention. In effect, we now have a pragmatic argument for adopting (4).
Unfortunately, however, this pragmatic argument is self-defeating. Suppose that
the betterness relation is represented by taking the expected value of f(P(h)) for
some strictly increasing but nonlinear function f. In note 7 in the next section we
will see that there are plenty of important views about the ethics of distribution
which say just that. But then it is arguable that the simplest overall way of
measuring goodness is by taking the goodness measures to be the positive affine
transformations of f(P(h)), not of P(h). For that means that one lottery is better than
another just in case its expected goodness is greater, an appealingly simple
representation. In effect, this means we have a counterexample to the pragmatic
argument for adopting (4).
The third attempt starts by trying to fix the problem with the second. Consider
what I will call the risk-involving definition of the priority view, which says that the
following is a definition of the priority view.
(5) According to the priority view, for some strictly increasing and strictly
concave w, the betterness relation is represented by taking expectations of P(w).6
I believe Broome (1991) was the first to propose this definition as an amendment to
the risk-free definition, a definition he had proposed earlier in the same book. It
clearly abandons a risk-free approach to the priority view, but let’s set that aside.
6 Thus for any lotteries L1 and L2, L1 is at least as good as L2 iff the expected value of P(w)(h) under L1 is
at least as great as the expected value of P(w)(h) under L2.
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Given (5), the reasoning behind the counterexample to the pragmatic argument just
discussed now motivates adopting (3). But as we have already seen, (3) implies that
the prioritarian platitudes featuring in the direct defense, particularly those
concerning absolute and declining marginal value, are vindicated.
However, it is important to understand the limitations of this conclusion. Suppose
we adopt the risk-involving definition. Then relative to some conventions for
speaking quantitatively about goodness, the priority view implies that benefits have
both absolute and declining marginal value. Relative to other conventions, the
priority view implies neither.
In the absence of any obvious constraints on goodness measures beyond (2), it
seems that if we are going to speak quantitatively about goodness, we should adopt
a convention on pragmatic grounds. Given (5), (3) is then the best convention to
adopt on the grounds that it makes the description in terms of goodness of what the
priority theory says appealingly mathematically simple. This turns out to vindicate
the idea that the priority view implies that benefits have both absolute and declining
marginal value. However, this is nothing more than a feature of a convention chosen
on the grounds of mathematical simplicity. But there is surely no a priori connection
between mathematical simplicity and ethical significance. Thus this approach to
goodness measures gives us no reason to believe that the priority view as defined by
the risk-involving definition rests on or embodies ideas concerning the absolute and
declining marginal value of benefits which are ethically natural and fundamental. In
retrospect, this objection would have applied to the second attempt as well.
I cannot claim to have surveyed every way in which the meaning of quantitative
talk about goodness might be fixed. I will say more in Sect. 10 where I will suggest
that many moral philosophers have made a methodological mistake about the proper
role of goodness measures in ethical theorizing. But for now the arguments of this
section suggest that it is going to be difficult to patch up the direct defense in a way
which both fends off the threat of presupposition failure and shows that the claim
that benefits have absolute and declining marginal value expresses an ethically
natural and fundamental idea.
However, since the direct and contrastive defenses are largely independent, it is
possible that despite the failure of the direct defense, the contrastive defense
succeeds. That would be enough to vindicate the risk-free definition, but the next
two sections will argue that the contrastive defense also fails.
8 Criticisms of The Contrastive Defense: Egalitarianism
The substantive claim the contrast with egalitarianism rested upon was RF6, the
idea that the boundary between the priority view and egalitarianism should be
understood in terms of strong separability. In Sect. 8.1 we will look at this appeal to
strong separability more closely, and find it problematic. However, one major
feature of Parfit’s discussion has not yet been properly discussed. One of Parfit’s
main reasons for finding the priority view appealing was his claim that
egalitarianism suffers from a serious problem, the so-called leveling down
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objection. I will later say how we might be able to treat this objection as an implicit
partial definition of the priority view. This might lead to a new defense of
characterizing the boundary between the priority view and egalitarianism in terms of
strong separability. But it might instead lead to a different way of drawing the
boundary, so we will treat the leveling down objection separately in Sect. 8.2.
8.1 Strong Separability
This subsection will argue that as so far presented, the contrastive defense does a
poor job at vindicating various platitudes connected with egalitarianism, in
particular P8, P9 and P10. I begin with two preliminary remarks about strong
separability before turning to the platitudes.
First, although it has often been said that egalitarianism and strong separability
are incompatible, to my knowledge no one has offered a simple example which
shows that egalitarians are forced to reject strong separability. In Sect. 5.1 we noted
that a modification of the Allais paradox which might seem to play this role was
proposed by Sen (1973) and Broome (1989). But as Broome (2004) admits (and
perhaps Sen intended all along), the example only shows that egalitarians can reject
strong separability, not that they have to. Moreover, the argument given in 5.1 for
the claim that egalitarianism should be characterized as denying strong separability
is overstated. It too only makes a case for the claim that egalitarians can reject
strong separability, not that they have to.
Second, recall that Sect. 5.1 presented an argument to the effect that the
‘‘nonrelative versus relative’’ distinction should be formalized via the ‘‘strongly
separable versus not strongly separable’’ distinction. But this conclusion is
mistaken. Consider the following.
The weak equality principle. Assume a constant population. Suppose that two
lotteries L1 and L2 are equally good for each member of the population, but L1
guarantees equality of outcome while L2 guarantees inequality of outcome.
Then L1 is better than L2.
To illustrate with an example due to Myerson (1981), the weak equality principle
implies that 1
2
; ½4; 4; 1
2
; ½0; 0  is better than 1
2
; ½4; 0; 1
2
; ½0; 4 .
The weak equality principle naturally expresses the idea that equality is valuable,
and is plainly concerned with how well off people are relative to others. But it turns
out to be consistent with strong separability of the risk-free betterness relation.7
Hence we cannot say that the ‘‘strongly separable versus not strongly separable’’
7 Sketch proof. Assume that one lottery is at least as good for an individual as another lottery just in case
the first gives the individual at least as much expected individual goodness. Let w be any strictly
increasing and strictly concave function, assume a fixed population 1, …, n and let E(w) be the function
defined on histories by EðwÞðhÞ ¼ w1 1n
Pn
i¼1 wðgiðhÞ
 
: The claim that the betterness relation is
represented by taking expectations of E(w)(h) is easily seen to entail both the weak equality principle and
that the risk-free betterness relation is strongly separable. Whether or not such accounts of the betterness
relation are genuine forms of egalitarianism involves much more complicated philosophical and
mathematical issues than I can go into here. For what it is worth, I argue in McCarthy (forthcoming) that
they are, but nothing here hinges on that conclusion.
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distinction captures the ‘‘nonrelative versus relative’’ distinction as there are natural
extensions of strongly separable orderings of histories which are concerned with
relativities. At best, strong separability is necessary for a nonrelative concern with
people, but not sufficient.
With these remarks to hand, what can we say about the claim that the contrastive
defense succeeds in vindicating the platitudes associated with egalitarianism?
Consider first the question of whether there is an ethically fundamental contrast
between egalitarianism and the priority view. In light of the first remark, the case for
characterizing egalitarianism in terms of the denial of strong separability is far from
convincing.8 There have been two reactions to this from friends of the risk-free
definition.
The first position continues to advocate characterizing egalitarianism as denying
strong separability, and thus makes a simple contrastive case for characterizing the
priority view as accepting strong separability. This guarantees that no egalitarian
ordering can be a prioritarian ordering, and vice versa. And as Jensen (2003) p. 92
puts it, it has the advantage that ‘‘a definition leading to practical differences in the
ordering of outcomes is more interesting’’. However, we lack a simple example
which shows that a concern with equality forces one to reject strong separability,
and the ‘‘nonrelative versus relative’’ distinction does not pick out strong
separability as a fundamental property. So while this position draws a clear
boundary between egalitarianism and the priority view, the cost is that it gives us no
reason for thinking it is a boundary which has fundamental ethical significance. It
therefore does a poor job at vindicating P8 and P9.
The second position, endorsed by Fleurbaey (2004) and Tungodden (2003), says
that denying strong separability is an option for egalitarians, but not a necessity.
Since the Pigou–Dalton principle is one of the main egalitarian ideas, this position
will regard prioritarian orderings as a strict subset of egalitarian orderings. But it
still maintains that there is some sort of contrastive case for defining the priority
view in this way. In making the priority view a specialization of an already known
basic distributive position, this position appears to undermine the idea that there is
something importantly new about the priority view. Thus it is not clear how it
vindicates P8 and P9. But Fleurbaey and Tungodden have a response. What is
distinctive about the priority view is not what it says about the way histories should
be ranked, but why it says it. So they would suggest that fundamental distributive
theories, such as egalitarianism and the priority view, should be identified not just
with accounts of the extension of the risk-free betterness relation, but should also
include justifications of those accounts. This makes room for the position that the
8 Notice that my claim is that it is hard to see a good reason to characterize egalitarianism in terms of the
denial of strong separability. For all I have argued, it might turn out to be the case that egalitarianism
entails the denial of strong separability. For example, it is arguable that any form of egalitarianism is
going to have to capture the weak equality principle. In conjunction with other ideas egalitarianism
should accept, that is likely to make egalitarianism a complicated theory. Perhaps that theory entails the
denial of strong separability. But this does not mean that egalitarianism should be characterized in terms
of strong separability. The characterization of a theory should be done in terms of axioms whose meaning
and motivation is fairly close to being self-evident; I have simply been claiming that we lack such a
motivation for the idea that egalitarians have to deny strong separability.
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priority view is a new and fundamental distributive view even if prioritarian
orderings are a subset of egalitarian orderings.
This position is going to have to locate all contrasts between the priority view and
egalitarianism at the level of justification, but it gives little indication of how to do
that. But this creates a worry. It is certainly possible to use different words at the
level of justification: one view solely talks about giving priority to the worse off and
nothing else, while the other talks about reducing inequality. But when a concern
with reducing inequality is combined with strong separability, it is far from obvious
that the slogan of giving priority to the worse off which is associated with the
priority view does not simply summarize this form of egalitarianism. It is often said
that a concern with equality can be expressed in a variety of ways (Jensen 2003),
and it is far from clear that different words used at the level of justification really do
indicate two fundamentally different kinds of positions.
Parfit does not discuss fairness, but to fully vindicate P8, the priority view would
have to be shown to be distinct from a concern with fairness. I do not have the space
to discuss fairness, but it is worth noting that on the view of Broome (1990–1991),
fairness requires goods to be distributed in proportion to how much people would
benefit from them. This idea has various interpretations, but the most natural turn
out to be versions of the priority view according to the risk-free definition (Segal
2006). This puts further pressure on the idea that the priority view is a new theory in
the ethics of distribution.
In summary, as it stands, the contrastive defense fails to give an account of the
priority view and egalitarianism which shows that there is a clear and ethically
important distinction between the priority view and egalitarianism, and thereby fails
to vindicate P8 and P9. In addition, no matter how it is defended, the risk-free
definition of the priority view fails to vindicate P10.
8.2 The Leveling Down Objection
Parfit (360) says that according to egalitarianism,
E. Equality is intrinsically valuable.
He then uses this claim to try to motivate the priority view by claiming that
egalitarianism is subject to what he called the leveling-down objection. The
objection claims that whenever there is inequality, bringing everyone down to the
level of the worst off member(s) of the population is in one way better according to
egalitarianism since it brings about perfect equality. But Parfit suggested that many
people will find this conclusion ‘‘absurd’’ (364).
Since Parfit does not offer an explicit definition of the priority view, it is tempting
to use these remarks as the basis for an implicit partial definition of the priority
view: the priority view should in part be characterized as making whatever claim it
is whose denial makes egalitarianism subject to the leveling down objection.
This proposal has a potential advantage. The defenses we discussed in Sect. 8.1
of characterizing the boundary between the priority view and egalitarianism is terms
of strong separability faced difficulties in explaining why that boundary has any
great ethical significance. But if egalitarianism is subject to a significant objection in
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virtue of denying some claim, then characterizing the boundary between the priority
view and egalitarianism in terms of that claim will pick out an important ethical
issue.
Since the priority view rejects E, the most appealing version of this proposal
would be to interpret E in a way which yields in a clear disagreement between
egalitarianism and the priority view and which shows why the egalitarian position
on the disagreement results in a leveling down objection. However, if we remain
within a risk-free framework, it is difficult to see how to do this. For example,
suppose we interpret E as
(6) An equal distribution is better than an unequal distribution of the same sum of
individual goodness.
According to the risk-free definition, the priority view also implies (6). So we will
have failed to have established that the priority view is a new and fundamental
distributive view. We could try to separate prioritarianism from egalitarianism by
distinguishing between the reasons for which they accept (6), egalitarianism because
it accepts E, prioritarianism for some other reason. But this leads us back to the
problems of locating the contrasts at the level of justification discussed in the
previous subsection.
In my opinion (McCarthy forthcoming), the only really satisfactory way of
interpreting the claim that equality is intrinsically valuable is to move to a risk-
involving framework. Consider the weak equality principle. That principle says that
when there is nothing to choose between two lotteries from the point of view of each
person, if one lottery guarantees equality while another guarantees inequality, then
the one which guarantees equality is always better. It is better because, to use
Parfit’s phraseology, the histories which could result from the first lottery are, from
the point of view of egalitarianism, ‘‘in one way better’’ than the histories which
could result from the second. It is hard to think of a more direct expression of the
claim that equality is intrinsically valuable than the weak equality principle, and
moreover, there is plainly no reason for the priority view to accept it.
We have been entertaining the conjecture that the priority view should be
characterized as making some claim whose denial makes egalitarianism subject to a
leveling down objection. Suppose that interpreting E via the weak equality principle
does not result in a significant leveling down objection. Then this route to
understanding the priority view fails at the outset. So suppose instead that it does
lead to a leveling down objection. It would still not follow that characterizing the
priority view as accepting strong separability avoids the leveling down objection.
This is established by note 7, which shows that a sensible theory containing the
weak equality principle is consistent with strong separability. But more, note 7
entails that according to the risk-free definition, the priority view can consistently be
extended to a theory which is vulnerable to a leveling down objection. Therefore,
obviously, the risk-free definition of the priority view cannot be defended as
articulating a theory which avoids the leveling down objection. Thus on either
supposition, appealing to the leveling down objection does not provide support for
the risk-free definition.
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9 Criticisms of the Contrastive Defense: Utilitarianism
This section will argue that the contrastive defense does a poor job at vindicating
various platitudes connected with utilitarianism, in particular P6, P7, P8 and P11.
These claims are all connected with the content and motivation of the Pigou–Dalton
principle.
Consider first P7, the idea that the priority view has distinctive implications in
one-person cases. Utilitarianism implies that in such cases, a history h1 is at least as
good as h2 just in case h1 is at least as good for the sole inhabitant as h2. So does
egalitarianism, for in one-person cases inequality is never an issue. But the risk-free
definition of the priority view implies that the priority view has exactly the same
implications in one-person worlds as both these views. This is not particularly
surprising. Since inequality is never an issue in one-person worlds, the antiegal-
itarian component of the priority view, whatever exactly it is, is not by itself going
to have distinctive one-person implications. But if the Pigou–Dalton principle is the
antiutilitarian component of the priority view, that aspect of the priority view will by
itself have no one-person implications at all, for it only applies when at least two
people are around.
Now one might think that this is not too devastating for the risk-free definition.
Parfit does not explicitly discuss one-person worlds, and an adequate account of the
priority view need not vindicate all of the prioritarian platitudes: it just has to
vindicate enough of them well enough. But the fact that the Pigou–Dalton principle
essentially involves two people leads to deeper trouble.
P6 tells us that the core of the priority view is somehow intrapersonal. So it is
odd that it should be interpreted by a principle which essentially involves at least
two people. The contrastive defense rested in part on the claim that the Pigou–
Dalton principle is obviously entailed by the idea that benefits have declining
marginal value. Since the idea that benefits have declining marginal value is not
clearly well-defined, this point would be better put by claiming that the Pigou–
Dalton principle provides a natural, although perhaps not complete, interpretation of
the idea that benefits have declining marginal value. So one might think that there is
nevertheless a very close connection between the Pigou–Dalton principle and the
core of the priority view.
But this claim is problematic. There is no obvious reason why one could not
accept that benefits have declining marginal value by accepting that benefiting men
matters more the worse off they are and that benefiting women matters more the
worse off they are, but nevertheless hold that benefiting women matters much more
than benefiting men. After all, Parfit takes care to emphasize that the slogan that
benefiting the worse off matters more is to be given a strictly intrapersonal
interpretation: ‘‘benefiting people matters more the worse off these people are’’
(366, 369, 372). But on the view just mentioned, it will sometimes be better to give
a unit of individual goodness to a better off woman than to a worse off man, contra
the Pigou–Dalton principle.
In effect, the claim that the Pigou–Dalton principle provides a natural
interpretation of the idea that benefits have declining marginal value takes
anonymity for granted. But while anonymity is plausible, the men and women
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example shows that it does not belong to the principle Parfit was trying to articulate
which he summarized via the slogan that benefiting the worse off matters more.
More precisely, let P stand for the core antiutilitarian idea behind the priority view,
an intrapersonal principle which has at least some important connection with the
idea that benefits have declining marginal value. Then our task is to figure out what
P is given that it has to satisfy: [P and anonymity] ) Pigou–Dalton, despite the fact
that P; Pigou–Dalton. But it is very hard to see what P could be. The only idea
which looks at all promising is to interpret P just as the claim that benefits have
declining marginal value. But this leads us straight back to the direct defense and the
problems with goodness measures already rehearsed.
A related worry about the Pigou–Dalton principle is that it presupposes that
individual goodness measures are unique up to positive affine transformation. But it
is far from obvious that they are. And if they are, it is far from obvious that a
particular principle expressed in terms of them, such as the Pigou–Dalton principle,
has any natural ethical significance. But the issues here parallel the worries about
goodness measures already discussed, so I will not discuss them any further.
Turning now to motivation, there is a logical peculiarity in the contrastive
defense. The contrastive defense claimed that the Pigou–Dalton principle is well
motivated because utilitarianism ignores the separateness of persons, and that
moving to the Pigou–Dalton principle is needed to respect the separateness of
persons. Utilitarianism was said to ignore the separateness of persons because it
rests on the impartial spectator argument, and the premises of that argument ignore
the separateness of persons. But just because some bad argument implies
utilitarianism, it would be a logical blunder to conclude merely from that fact
that there is something wrong with utilitarianism. Perhaps some good argument
implies utilitarianism.
There is growing acknowledgement that by far the best defense of utilitarianism
is provided by a theorem due to Harsanyi (1955).9 Aside from some idealizing
assumptions to do with comparability which can most likely eventually be
dispensed with, there is a strong prima facie case for its premises. This puts those
who wish to defend distributive alternatives to utilitarianism under a perhaps helpful
obligation: say which of the Harsanyi premises you disagree with, and why. But this
has at least two implications which friends of the priority view will have to take
seriously. First, the theorem does not make any assumptions about evaluative
measurements. So as it stands, it is far from clear where the Pigou–Dalton principle
even takes issue with the Harsanyi premises. So the contrastive defense does a poor
job at vindicating P8. Second, the theorem does not use anything like an impartial
spectator style construction and conflate persons in the way the impartial spectator
argument is said to. So the separateness of persons objection has no obvious target,
and anyone who wishes to use something like it to articulate or defend a
distinctively prioritarian critique of utilitarianism has much work to do. But without
a clear, nonegalitarian motivation for the Pigou–Dalton principle, the contrastive
defense also does a poor job at vindicating P8.
9 See e.g. Broome (1991) and Gibbard (2008). For an accessible discussion of the technicalities of the
theorem, see Resnik (1987).
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10 Conclusions
Given the restriction to a risk-free framework, I have argued for three things. First,
the direct defense of the risk-free definition of the priority view may well suffer
from presupposition failure, and even if it does not, it fails to show that the ideas it
takes to define the priority view have any fundamental ethical significance. Second,
the egalitarian half of the contrastive defense rests on an unconvincing character-
ization of egalitarianism, and natural responses to this problem involve either
drawing a somewhat arbitrary boundary between egalitarianism and the priority
view, or else obscurely claiming that the differences between the two views are all
located at the level of justification. Third, the utilitarian half of the contrastive
defense leaves it unclear where the priority view takes issue with the best defense of
utilitarianism, and whether the priority view rests on a well-motivated but
nonegalitarian criticism of utilitarianism. In addition, the risk-free definition of
the priority view fails to vindicate some of the prioritarian platitudes no matter how
it is defended, in particular the platitudes connected with the intrapersonal nature of
the priority view. These failures are so extensive that I conclude that given the
restriction to a risk-free framework, no theory vindicates the prioritarian platitudes
well enough for the priority view to be well-defined. But despite this negative
conclusion, three positive methodological lessons emerge, to do with risk,
measurement, and axiomatization.
Consider first axiomatization. Thanks to Harsanyi and others, we have a gold
standard for developing and defending views about the ethics of distribution: the
informal articulation and defense of natural and appealing ethical ideas; the
formalization of such ideas into claims suitable to be premises of formal theory,
with any problematic presuppositions made fully explicit; and proof of a
representation theorem characterizing the theory in question. It is unfortunate that
much work in philosophy about the ethics of distribution does not look beyond the
first stage. In the case of discussions of the priority view, this has had three bad
effects. First, the characterization of egalitarianism as, for example, accepting that
equality is intrinsically valuable, falls far short of being a suitable premise of a
formal theory. It needs to be interpreted in a way which has concrete and
unambiguous implications about betterness. The problems we have seen with the
egalitarian half of the contrastive defense come from neglecting that task. Second,
the utilitarian half of the contrastive defense suffers from neglecting the fact that we
do have a good axiomatic defense of utilitarianism, the one provided by Harsanyi.
Third, the direct defense rests on several claims couched in terms of evaluative
measures. But when we make explicit the presuppositions needed for these claims to
be well-defined and to deliver the theorems the direct defense requires, it becomes
clear that the direct defense is highly problematic.
Consider next measurement. In the physical and social sciences, there is a fairly
standard view about measurement: at the more fundamental level there are just
various sorts of qualitative structures which can be described in measurement-free
terms, while quantitative measurements emerge at a less fundamental level as useful
descriptions of those qualitative structures. Which measurements are meaningful
and the extent to which they are unique depends on the nature of the underlying
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qualitative structures (see e.g. Krantz et al 1971; Narens 2007; Roberts 2009). It is
odd that much theorizing about the ethics of distribution takes the reverse approach.
Evaluative measures (e.g. goodness measures and individual goodness measures)
are regarded as exogenously supplied and tacitly assumed to be reasonably unique,
then put to work in the articulation and defense of distributive theories whose
ultimate output is qualitative, namely an account of when one situation is better than
another. The direct defense of the risk-free definition of the priority view provides a
good example. I believe that there is no good reason for the reversal of direction
taken in moral philosophy.10 While it would take a separate paper to argue that this
reversal is a mistake, the difficulties the direct defense faces in virtue of the
assumptions it makes about evaluative measurement may serve as a useful case
study.
Consider finally risk. Given that Parfit and much of the subsequent literature on
the priority view never mentions risk, trying to define the priority view in terms of
risk from the outset would have seemed a fool’s errand. But apart from the
difficulties we have seen with risk-free approaches to the priority view, we have
seen some positive reasons for approaching the priority view in terms of risk. The
essentially risk-involving weak equality principle is most likely still some distance
from characterizing the core of egalitarianism; roughly speaking, it only offers an
interpretation of ‘‘equality is intrinsically valuable’’, but egalitarians will also want
to say ‘‘less inequality is intrinsically better than more inequality’’. Nevertheless, the
weak equality principle already appears to be something the priority view should
reject, so pursuing this may lead to the antiegalitarian component of the priority
view. In turn, articulating the antiutilitarian component of the priority view is going
to have to pay attention to the premises of Harsanyi’s theorem, but those too are
deeply to do with risk.
Now it might be objected: even if we eventually have to consider risk when
developing an account of the priority view, it does not follow that we cannot make a
lot of progress by first considering the risk-free case. But in response, I think it is
quite surprising how little progress we can make in a risk-free framework.
The only concrete risk-free claim about the priority view we have examined
which survives all the various criticisms of risk-free approaches is as follows. Say
that a function f on individual/history pairs represents the risk-free extended
individual betterness relation just in case for any individuals i and j and any histories
h1 and h2, f(i, h1) C f(j, h2) iff h1 is at least as good for i as h2 is for j. Now although
it is far from obvious whether egalitarianism has to reject strong separability, it
seems reasonably clear that the priority view should accept it. The claim which then
survives is that according to the priority view,
(7) Given a population of individuals 1, …, n of least three people, for some
function f which represents the risk-free extended individual betterness relation,
the risk-free betterness relation is represented by f1 þ    þ fn; where
fi(h) : = f(i, h).
10 A broadly similar view is expressed in Broome (1991) and Hammond (1991).
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Assuming a rich domain, this follows along the lines of the derivation of Theorem 2
from the assumption that according to the priority view, the risk-free principle of
personal good is true, and the risk-free betterness is anonymous, continuous, and
strongly separable. However, this achieves very little. For (7) is accepted by
utilitarianism, and is not obviously not accepted by egalitarianism. Moreover, there
is something potentially misleading about characterizing the priority view in terms
of strong separability. Utilitarianism implies strong separability, but strong
separability is not one of the Harsanyi premises, nor is it implied by any single
one of those premises. Thus for utilitarians, strong separability has a derived status,
and one might well suspect that the same should be true for the priority view. But
investigating this further would involve looking closely at how strong separability
emerges from the Harsanyi premises, and that would mean looking closely at risk.
For what it is worth, I believe that there is an interesting way of trying to
understand both the antiutilitarian and antiegalitarian components of the priority
view in terms which essentially involve risk which is more promising than any risk-
free approach. But whether the priority view does turn out to be an important new
position on the ethics of distribution seems to me to be very unclear. This needs
separate discussion.11
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Appendix: A Proof of Proposition 1
Assuming RF1 through RF5, we wish to show the left to right direction of the
biconditional in Proposition 1. So assume that the betterness relation is anonymous,
the risk-free principle of personal good is true, and that benefits have absolute and
declining marginal value. We wish to show that for some strictly increasing and
strictly concave w, P(w) is a goodness measure. The case n = 1 is trivial so assume
n [ 1. Let the interval I be as per the definition of a rich domain.
By RF1 let G* be a goodness measure, unique up to positive affine
transformation. By anonymity we can write G*(h) as Gðx1; . . .; xnÞ where
½x1; . . .; xn is the individual goodness profile of h. Since benefits are absolute we
have that for all x1; . . .; xn; w1; y1; . . .; yn 2 I
Gðx1; x2; . . .; xnÞ  Gðw1; x2; . . .; xnÞ ¼ Gðx1; y2; . . .; ynÞ  Gðw1; y2; . . .; ynÞ
This implies that Gðx1; x2; . . .; xnÞ  Gðw1; x2; . . .; xnÞ is independent of x2; . . .; xn
so we can write it as H1(x1, w1). Hence Gðx1; x2; . . .; xnÞ ¼ H1ðx1; w1Þ
11 I attempt it in McCarthy (2011).
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þGðw1; x2; . . .; xnÞ. Fix w1 to obtain functions h1(x1) = dfH1(x1, w1) and
g2ðx2; . . .; xnÞ ¼df Gðw1; x2; . . .; xnÞ so
(8) Gðx1; x2; . . .; xnÞ ¼ h1ðx1Þ þ g2ðx2; . . .; xnÞ
Since benefits are absolute we also have
Gðx1; x2; x3; . . .; xnÞ  Gðx1; w2; x3; . . .; xnÞ
¼ Gðy1; x2; y3; . . .; ynÞ  Gðy1; w2; y3; . . .; ynÞ
By (8) it follows that
g2ðx2; x3; . . .; xnÞ  g2ðw2; x3; . . .; xnÞ ¼ g2ðx2; y3; . . .; ynÞ  g2ðw2; y3. . .; ynÞ
A similar argument then shows that there are functions h2(x2) and g3ðx3; . . .; xnÞ
such that
g2ðx2; . . .; xnÞ ¼ h2ðx2Þ þ g3ðx3; . . .; xnÞ
Hence
Gðx1; x2; . . .; xnÞ ¼ h1ðx1Þ þ h2ðx2Þ þ g3ðx3; . . .; xnÞ
Proceeding in this way we obtain functions h3; . . .; hn such that
Gðx1; x2; . . .; xnÞ ¼ h1ðx1Þ þ h2ðx2Þ þ    þ hnðxnÞ
Anonymity then implies that the hi’s are identical. Write them as w. The risk-free
principle of personal good implies that w is strictly increasing. And since benefits
have declining marginal value it follows that for all y [ x; w xþy
2
  wðxÞ[
wðyÞ  w xþy
2
 
, hence w is strictly concave. Thus for some strictly increasing and
strictly concave function w, G is identical to P(w) as required. h
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